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Abstract 
 
We evaluate the effects of state policy design features on SCHIP take up rates and on the degree 
to which SCHIP benefits crowd out private benefits.  The results indicate that overall program 
take up rates range from 10.1 to 10.5 percent.  However, there is considerable heterogeneity 
across states, suggesting a potential role of inter-state variation in policy design.  We find that 
several design mechanisms have significant and substantial positive effects on take up.  For 
example, eliminating asset tests, offering continuous coverage, simplifying the application and 
renewal processes, and extending benefits to parents all have sizable and positive effects on take-
up rates.  Mandatory waiting periods, on the other hand, consistently reduce take-up rates.  In all, 
inter-state differences in outreach and anti-crowd out efforts explain roughly one quarter of the 
cross-state variation in take-up rates.  Concerning the crowding out of private health insurance 
benefits, we find that between one quarter and one third of the increase in public health insurance 
coverage for SCHIP eligible children is offset by a decline in private health coverage.  We find 
little evidence that the policy-induced variation in take-up is associated with a significant degree 
of crowd-out, and no evidence that the negative effect on private coverage caused by state policy 
choices is any greater than the overall crowding out effect.  This suggests that states are not 
augmenting take-up rates by enrolling children that are relatively more likely to have private 
health insurance benefits. 
 
JEL Codes: I18, I38, H31, G22, J13 
 
Key Words: State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), Crowd Out, Take Up
  1I.  Introduction 
In 1997, Congress created the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) in an 
attempt to expand insurance coverage to children in low-income families.  Unlike Medicaid, 
which provides health insurance benefits to poor households, SCHIP extends benefits to children 
in near-poor households, with some states extending coverage to children in families with 
income levels as high as 350 percent of the federal poverty level.  SCHIP has dramatically 
increased the number of children eligible for and enrolled in public health insurance programs.  
Between 1997 and 2001, the proportion of children eligible for public health insurance increased 
from roughly one-third to one-half.  Concurrently, SCHIP program enrollment increased from 1 
million children in December 1998, to 5.3 million children in fiscal year 2002 (CMS 2003).   
The ability of the SCHIP program to increase insurance coverage rates for children in 
near-poor families depends on a number of factors.  First, states must enroll previously ineligible 
children in a new public health insurance program.  Encouraging take up among near poor 
families may be particularly difficult, as fewer such families collect other forms of public 
assistance and stigma effects are likely to be large.  The fact that state-level spending on SCHIP 
benefits has been consistently below the allotment of SCHIP funds suggests that the rate at 
which eligible children take up program benefits is far below potential.
 1     
Moreover, to the extent that newly eligible children that take up SCHIP benefits 
substitute public health insurance for privately provided benefits, the effect of the SCHIP 
expansion on overall coverage will be mitigated.  At the program’s inception, policy makers 
expressed concern about the potential for SCHIP to crowd out private health insurance, since the 
                                                 
1 By the end of Fiscal year 2002, eight states had used less than 25 percent of their available allotment, twenty-one 
states had used between 25 and 50 percent, and the remaining twenty-two states had spent more than 50 percent.  
However, of these twenty-two states, only two (New Jersey and Rhode Island) had spent more than 75 percent 
(Green Book 2004). 
  2majority of children made eligible for public insurance under the program already had private 
health insurance coverage (LaSasso and Buchmueller 2002).  
To facilitate take-up yet control the degree of private coverage crowd out, states have 
experimented with a number of policy design features.  For example, some states have simplified 
the application process, others have eliminated face-to-face eligibility interviews and asset tests, 
while others have extended coverage to the parents of eligible children.  Anti-crowd out efforts 
entail measures designed to limit the relative attractiveness of public health insurance for those 
with private benefits.  For example, many states require mandatory waiting periods following the 
loss of private health benefits before the children in a family become eligible for SCHIP benefits.  
While researchers have estimated overall take up and crowd out rates associated with the 
introduction of SCHIP (LaSasso and Buchmueller 2002), there has been no attempt to evaluate 
the efficacy of these design details. 
In this project, we evaluate the effects of specific state policy design features on SCHIP 
take up rates and on the degree to which SCHIP benefits crowd out private benefits.  Using a 
characterization of state policy variation presented by the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and 
the Uninsured (Cohen-Ross and Cox, 2002) and data from the 1998 and 2002 March Current 
Population Surveys, we assess the extent to which interstate differences in take-up and crowd-out 
are attributable to interstate variation in the functional implementation of SCHIP. Our principal 
estimates are based on the relative change in public and private sector coverage rates among 
SCHIP eligible households between 1997 and 2001. 
We find that overall program take up rates range from 10.1 to 10.5 percent, but that there 
is considerably heterogeneity across states.  We also find that several design mechanisms have 
significant and substantial positive effects on take up.  For example, eliminating asset tests, 
  3offering continuous coverage, simplifying the application and renewal processes, and extending 
benefits to parents all have sizable and positive effects on take-up rates.  Mandatory waiting 
periods, on the other hand, consistently reduce take-up rates.  Our results suggest that a fair 
portion of the inter-state variation in SCHIP take up rates is attributable to inter-state differences 
in policy implementation.  Specifically, our model explains approximately 25 percent of the 
considerable variation across states in the change in public coverage rates among SCHIP eligible 
children between 1997 and 2001. 
  Concerning the crowding out of private health insurance benefits, we find that between 
one quarter and one third of the increase in public health insurance coverage for SCHIP eligible 
children is offset by a decline in private health coverage.  To assess whether state policy efforts 
are exacerbating this problem by enrolling children with a high likelihood of private coverage, 
we estimate whether the crowd out caused by policy-induced take up differs from the overall 
crowd out rate for the program.  We find little evidence that state policy choices that augment 
take-up crowd out private health coverage.  We find no evidence suggesting that the degree of 
crowd out caused by state policy design exceeds the overall level of crowd-out among SCHIP 
recipients.  This suggests that states are not augmenting take-up rates by enrolling children that 
are relatively more likely to have private health insurance benefits. 
 
II.  The SCHIP Program and the Effect on Child Eligibility for Public Health Insurance 
As part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress created the State Children's Health 
Insurance Program (SCHIP) in an attempt to expand insurance coverage to children in low-
income families.  The original legislation provides $40 billion in Federal matching funds through 
fiscal year 2007 for state-designed and operated public health insurance programs.  Aimed at 
  4children in “near-poor” families, SCHIP is one of the largest expansions of health insurance to 
children since the introduction of Medicaid (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
2004).
2   
SCHIP targets children in low-income families with incomes too high to qualify for 
Medicaid benefits.  For the most part, children in families with income less than 200 percent of 
the poverty line are eligible,
3 although the legislation grants states some flexibility in setting 
eligibility cutoffs.
4  States with Medicaid eligibility cutoffs at or above 200 percent of the 
poverty line were granted the option to increase the SCHIP income cutoff by an additional 50 
percentage points.  As a result, some states have extended coverage to children in families with 
income levels up to 350 percent of the poverty line.  Unlike Medicaid, SCHIP benefits are not an 
entitlement.  States are allotted funds based on a matching formula and each state is allowed to 
define the “targeted” group of low-income children to receive health insurance through the 
SCHIP program.
5  
                                                 
2 Several laws associated with SCHIP have been enacted since its creation in 1997.  For example, the Omnibus 
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999 changed the allotment formula to classify 
children covered under Indian Health Services as “uninsured” and thereby making them eligible for SCHIP.  In 
addition, technical corrections to title XXI were made in the Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999 to stabilize 
the allotment formula and improve data collection.  More recently, several laws have modified the redistribution 
rules for unspent funds (in fiscal years 1998 and 1999 (Public Law 106-554) and in FY 2000 and 2001(Public Law 
108-74)) and have extended the availability of such funds (Green Book 2004). 
3 While SCHIP is aimed at low-income children, there are some groups of low-income children who are not eligible.  
For example, children eligible for Medicaid and children who are members of families currently eligible for state 
employee insurance are not eligible to receive coverage under SCHIP (CMS 2004).  In addition, and children who 
live in an Institution for Mental Diseases are also ineligible to receive coverage under SCHIP (CMS 2004)  see 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/schip/about-SCHIP.asp    
4 For example, states can use geography, age, income and resources, residency, disability status, access to other 
health insurance, and duration of SCHIP enrollment in determining eligibility (Green Book 2004). 
5 Each state has a fixed allotment of SCHIP funds that are distributed as a Federal match with an enhanced matching 
rate, ranging from 65% to 85% (Green Book 2004).  State allotments are determined through a formula that takes 
into account both the “number of children” and a “state cost factor” that reflects the cost of health care in a given 
state.   The number of children is based on 50% of the low-income uninsured children in the state plus 50% of the 
number of low-income children in the state. The state cost factor is based on annual health service industry wages in 
the state compared to the national average.  For most states, allotments available for a fiscal year can be used over 
the next 3 years; however, funds still available after such time may be redistributed among those states that fully 
expend their allotments (CMS 2004).   
  5The introduction of SCHIP greatly expanded the proportion of children eligible for public 
health insurance.  Table 1 presents the proportion of all children and uninsured children that are 
eligible for Medicaid and SCHIP benefits in 1997 and 2001.  These figures are based on 
tabulations from the 1998 and 2002 March Current Population Survey.
6  In 1997, 34 percent of 
U.S. children were eligible for public health insurance through the Medicaid program.  In 2001, 
this increases to 51 percent with 19 percent eligible for SCHIP benefits and 32 percent eligible 
for Medicaid.  Restricting the focus to uninsured children, roughly half are eligible for Medicaid 
benefits while one quarter are eligible for SCHIP benefits.  These figures suggest that much of 
the problem of uninsured children in the U.S. could be addressed via existing programs, with 
SCHIP filling a substantial gap. 
The expansion depicted in Table 1 occurred along several margins and reduced much of 
the unevenness in eligibility for public health insurance created by state-level variation in the 
implementation of the Medicaid program.  First, the program increased eligibility for children in 
families above the poverty line.  Figure 1 depicts the effect of the introduction of SCHIP on the 
proportion of children eligible for benefits by family income relative to the poverty line in 2001.
7  
The figure presents the proportion of children in each group eligible for public health insurance 
under the 1997 Medicaid criteria and under the combination of the 1997 and 2001 Medicaid and 
SCHIP eligibility criteria.
8  In the absence of SCHIP, nearly all children living below the poverty 
line would be eligible for Medicaid benefits.  As income increases, the proportion eligible for 
Medicaid declines precipitously.  With SCHIP, nearly all children with income-to-poverty ratios 
less than 1.5 are eligible for public health insurance.  Roughly 90 percent of children in families 
                                                 
6 The data and our definitions of eligibility are discussed in greater detail below. 
7 For Figures 1 to 5, children are put into 17 income groups where an income group is defined by family income 
relative to the Federal Poverty Level and each group represents a range of twenty-five percentage points.    
8 The figure is based on tabulations from the 2002 March Current Population Survey. 
  6with income between 150 and 200 percent of the poverty line are eligible.  Beyond 200 percent 
of the poverty line, however, eligibility rates drop off quickly. 
In addition to extending eligibility further up the family income distribution, the 
introduction of SCHIP reduced the degree of inter-state variation in eligibility criteria for public 
health benefits.  Specifically, states with the least generous Medicaid programs (--i.e., the most 
stringent eligibility criteria) experienced the largest increases in the proportion of children 
eligible for public benefits under SCHIP.  Figure 2 and 3 depict this fact.  Figure 2 shows the 
proportion of children in 2001 that would be eligible for Medicaid benefits under the 1997 
eligibility criteria for states with relatively small SCHIP expansions and states with large SCHIP 
expansions.
9  Figure 3 displays the average change in eligibility by family income for these two 
groups of states.  On average, small expansion states offer Medicaid benefits to more children 
within each income category and have eligibility cutoffs that extend further up the income 
distribution than states experiencing large expansions.  Thus, the SCHIP expansion reduced the 
degree of cross-state variation in eligibility criteria for public health insurance. 
Finally, SCHIP reduced the unevenness in eligibility among children of different ages.  
Given the imperfect coverage of older children under state Medicaid programs in 1997, the 
SCHIP expansion disproportionately impacted the eligibility of this group.  Appendix Table A 
compares the family income eligibility cut-offs for Medicaid in 1997 to the SCHIP eligibility 
cutoffs in 2001.  In nearly half the states, the 1997 Medicaid cutoffs for older children (15 to 18 
years of age) are below100 percent of the poverty line, while a large share of states also have 
                                                 
9 To identify states with small and large SCHIP expansions, we used the 2002 March CPS to calculated the 
proportion of children in each state in 2001 that is eligible for SCHIP benefits given the SCHIP eligibility criteria 
and the 1997 Medicaid eligibility criteria.  We then stratify states into two groups: states with a proportion eligible 
that is grater than the proportion in the median state and states with a proportion eligible that is less than or equal to 
the proportion in the median states.  We identify the former group as large expansion states and the latter group as 
small expansion states.   
  7tighter Medicaid eligibility criteria for children 6 to 14 years of age relative to younger children.  
By contrast, the SCHIP eligibility criteria are, for the most part, uniform across age groups.  
Thus, in addition to expanding eligibility to children in near poor families and reducing inter-
state variation in eligibility criteria, the SCHIP expansion also filled in the eligibility gaps for 
poor older children created by the uneven eligibility criteria of the Medicaid program.   
Under the 1997 legislation, states were required to implement the SCHIP program in one 
of three manners: (1) by expanding the state Medicaid program to children who previously did 
not qualify for the program (Medicaid Expansion (ME)), (2) by creating a stand-alone, state-
designed program (SCHIP separate program (SP)), or (3) by implementing a combination of the 
two by initially expanding Medicaid programs and then adding a state-designed portion 
(Combination (Combo)).  If a state chooses to expand their existing Medicaid program (ME), the 
eligibility rules of Medicaid apply (CMS 2004).  However, states may make changes to their 
Medicaid expansion programs (such as establishing waiting periods and implementing 
enrollment fees) through an 1115 waiver (Green Book 2004).  As of September 30, 1999, all 
states and territories had a SCHIP plan approved and in place (CMS 2004).  By December 2003, 
13 states plus the District of Columbia (and several U.S. territories) expanded Medicaid, 18 
states had created separate state-designed programs, and 19 states had a combination program in 
place (CMS 2004).   
 
III.  SCHIP Take-Up and the Crowding Out of Private Health Insurance Coverage 
The net effect of the introduction of the SCHIP program on insurance coverage rates 
depends on both the extent to which eligible children take up benefits and the extent to which 
public coverage crowds out private coverage.  In previous expansions of public health programs 
  8in the United States, take-up rates vary considerably but are typically low for targeted uninsured 
low-income children (Currie 2003).  Following the Medicaid expansions of the late1980s and 
early 1990s, a number of studies examined the ensuing take-up by children of public health 
insurance (Cutler and Gruber 1996; Dubay and Kenney 1997; Shore-Sheppard 2000; Yacizi and 
Kaestner 2000; Card and Shore-Sheppard 2001; and Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2003).  
Depending on the data and the time period studied, take up rate estimates indicate that between 
one-tenth and one-third of children newly eligible for Medicaid enroll in the program and receive 
benefits.  For example, Cutler and Gruber (1996) conclude that of newly eligible children, 23 
percent take up coverage.  In a study of the effects of OBRA 1989 and OBRA 1990, Card and 
Shore-Sheppard (2001) found a 10 to 15 percentage point rise in Medicaid coverage among poor 
children born after September 30, 1983 when all of these children were made eligible.  Studies 
have also found that take-up declines when eligibility extends to higher income families (Card 
and Shore-Sheppard 2001; Currie and Gruber 1996).   
The existing research on SCHIP finds take-up rates that are fairly low (LoSasso and 
Buchmueller 2002), a pattern that is well evident in Figure 4.  The figure presents the proportion 
of children covered by public health insurance in 1997 and 2001 by family income relative to the 
poverty line.  While there is some evidence that public coverage increased for children 
principally affected by the introduction of SCHIP, coverage rates are considerably lower than the 
proportion eligible displayed in Figure 1.
10
Low SCHIP take-up rates are likely to be a function of several factors.  Newly eligible 
children and their families are likely to be unaware of the change in their eligibility status, 
especially if such households do not receive other public benefits, such as food stamps or income 
  9assistance.  In addition, transaction costs and/or the possible stigma associated with public 
programs may further inhibit take up (Currie 2003).  For example, transaction costs per child are 
likely to be higher for households with fewer children and higher income households that have 
never received public assistance. Currie (2003) posits that the stigma associated with receiving 
public benefits may be larger when recipients are forced to divulge personal information on 
applications.  Indeed, Cunningham (2001) finds evidence that low take-up rates for SCHIP in 
high uninsurance areas are likely due to non-economic factors such as stigma, lower preferences 
for health coverage, language barriers, lack of awareness, and lack of understanding of the 
importance of access to health care.   
In light of the low take up rates associated with previous Medicaid expansions, many 
states included a number of specific outreach policies designed to facilitate enrollment in their 
designated SCHIP program.  For example, to encourage take up, many states grant presumptive 
eligibility to applicants, some have simplified the application process by reducing paperwork and 
eliminating face-to-face interviews, many states have implemented bilingual outreach efforts, 
and some have even extended benefits to the parents of eligible children (Rosenbach et al. 2001). 
In addition to concerns over low take up rates, policy makers and individual states were 
also concerned that currently insured persons made eligible for SCHIP would drop their private 
coverage and take advantage of the expanded public health insurance for their children.
11  Such 
substitution may result from several behavioral responses to becoming eligible for SCHIP 
benefits.  Employers that are aware that the children of their employees are eligible for a new 
state program may cease to offer health insurance to family members and encourage employees 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 At lowest income levels, public coverage fell and likely reflects the decline in welfare rolls over this period.  It is 
possible that the push to help families move from welfare-to-work may have mistakenly resulted in children being 
dropped from Medicaid (Shore-Shepparad 2003).   
  10to seek public benefits.
12  Alternatively, parents who are locked into a job for the family health 
benefits may feel less constrained with the existence of SCHIP and may seek employment where 
other dimensions of compensation (wages, scheduling flexibility etc.) are more attractive.  To 
address such concern regarding “crowd-out,” the legislation itself included language indicating 
that SCHIP funds are explicitly designed to provide health insurance coverage only to uninsured 
children.   
Moreover, most states have attempted to limit crowd-out by implementing a combination 
of deterrents.  For example, several state plans include waiting periods for moving from private 
to public insurance.  Others have implemented sliding-scale premium contributions for higher 
income families among the eligibles.  Although less frequent, other states assist or subsidize 
employer supplied insurance premiums in an attempt to limit crowd out. 
An initial look at the data suggests that early concerns regarding the potential for crowd 
out were well founded.  Figure 5 present the proportion of children with private health insurance 
coverage by income relative to the poverty line for 1997 and 2001.  While private coverage 
increased for children in households with income below the poverty line, there are notable 
declines in private coverage for children in families with income between 100 and 300 percent of 
the poverty line. As a proportion of the increase in public insurance coverage displayed in Figure 
3, the declines in private coverage for children in families with income between 100 and 300 
percent of the poverty line range from 0.03 to 0.66, with an un-weighted average relative 
decrease across these income categories of 0.38.  As an initial estimate of the degree of crowd-
                                                                                                                                                             
11In addition to this type of “crowd-out”, employers could also adjust their behavior increasing out-of-pocket costs 
of private insurance to encourage employees to switch to public health insurance.  
12 Shore-Sheppard, Buchmueller, and Jensen (2000) examine the mechanism by which crowding out occurs for 
small firms.  They find no evidence of employers changing insurance offerings to workers following the expansions.  
However, they find a negative relationship between Medicaid eligibility of a firm’s employees and the take-up rate 
for health insurance offered by the firm. 
  11out caused by the SCHIP expansion, this figure lies in the middle of the range of extant estimates 
and suggests that crowd-out is at least as much of a problem in SCHIP despite the specific 
measures taken by individual states.
13
Concurrent with the cross-state policy variation, there is considerable variation across 
states in observable take up and crowd out rates.  Figure 6 presents a scatter plot of the 1997 to 
2001 change in the proportion of SCHIP eligible children covered by private health insurance 
against the comparable change in the proportion of eligible children covered by public health 
insurance, where each observation corresponds to an individual state.  Each data point is 
weighted by the number of observations from the 1998 March Current Population Survey.  There 
are large cross state differences in the proportion of eligible children that take up benefits, 
ranging from slight declines to increases on the order of 0.3.  Similarly, changes in the 
proportion covered by private insurance vary considerably across states.  The scatter plot reveals 
a negative relationship between the changes in private and public coverage.  A weighted 
regression suggests that each percentage point change in public health coverage causes a 0.25 
percentage point decrease in private coverage (an alternative crowd out estimate based on cross 
state variation in take up that is comparable to that derived from Figure 5).  However, the figure 
suggests that there is considerable heterogeneity in crowd out across states.
14  
  Despite the evident crowd out in Figures 5 and 6, the SCHIP expansion does indeed 
appear to have increased insurance coverage among the targeted group of children.  Figure 7 
presents the proportion of children with any form of insurance coverage in 1997 and 2001 by 
                                                 
13 In empirical studies of crowd out, researchers typically estimate the share of enrollment in expanded or newly 
introduced public program that can be attributed to a reduction in private coverage.  Estimate of crowd out for 
Medicaid expansions range considerably, from finding no crowd out (Hamm and Shore-Sheppard 2003) to 
approximately 50 percent crowd out (Cutler and Gruber 1996).  See Davidson et al. (2004) for a thorough review of 
the empirical evidence on crowd out. 
14 Those observations lying above the regression line exhibit declines in private coverage for a given increase in 
public coverage that is less than expected, while the latter is true for states lying below the regression line. 
  12family income relative to the poverty line.  In 1997, the coverage income profile was U-shaped 
with relatively high coverage rates for very low-income and middle and upper income children 
and the lowest coverage rates for children in near-poor families.  The introduction of the SCHIP 
program eliminates the dip in coverage rates for children in near poor families, yielding a 
coverage-income profile that increases uniformly in income.
15
  The patterns in Figure 7 suggest that the introduction of SCHIP had a substantial effect 
on coverage, despite the low take up rates and evidence of crowd out.  Knowledge of which state 
policies boost take up could perhaps improve the efficacy of the program and insure more 
children in families just above the poverty line.  In what follows, we present a more formal 
analysis of the impact of policy variation on take up, crowd out and overall coverage. 
 
IV.  Data Description and Methodological Approach  
To estimate the effects of state policy variation, we pursue the following estimation 
strategy.  First, using data from the March Current Population Surveys in conjunction with state 
level eligibility criteria for SCHIP and Medicaid, we identify children eligible for SCHIP 
benefits.  We identify observations that are income eligible for SCHIP benefits in 2001 as well as 
children that would have been eligible in 1997 (under 2001 income criteria) had the program 
been in existence.   The effect of SCHIP on public insurance and the effect of the expansion on 
private coverage are estimated by calculating the change over time in the proportion of eligible 
children receiving public and private health insurance benefits. 
Second, we assess the effect of state policy variation by estimating the differences in the 
change in coverage rates and private sector crowd out for states with and without various policy 
                                                 
15 Shore-Sheppard (2000) demonstrates that the Medicaid expansions during the late 1980s had a similar impact on 
the coverage-income profile.  
  13design features.  We use a classification scheme from the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and 
the Uninsured (Cohen-Ross and Cox, 2002) to characterize state-level policy variation and 
estimate the effects of specific features, holding constant all other efforts made by the state to 
enroll eligible children and to deter private sector crowd out.  In this section, we describe in 
detail our data and methods for identifying eligible children as well as our estimation 
methodology. 
Data Description and Identifying Eligible Children 
We draw samples of children from the 1998 and 2002 Current Population Survey (CPS) 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (formerly called the March Supplement or the Annual 
Demographic Supplement).  Since income and health insurance coverage questions in the March 
CPS refer to the prior calendar year, the 2002 data are used to estimate coverage and eligibility 
for the year 2001 while the 1998 data are used to estimate coverage and eligibility for the year 
1997.
16
Identifying children in the CPS that are eligible for public health insurance benefits 
requires two sources of information: (1) information on family income net of allowable 
disregards, and (2) state level information on Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility criteria.  The 
income eligibility criteria for both Medicaid and SCHIP are based on family net income relative 
to the federal poverty line.  To gauge income, we construct a family income variable from the 
person level records of the CPS applying the Medicaid definition of families. The federal 
definition of a family for the purpose of assessing Medicaid eligibility includes the child 
(applicant), the child’s siblings, and the child’s legally responsible relatives living in the 
household (as opposed to all relatives or individuals living in the household).  Thus, for the 
  14family of each child, we cumulate person level income for all children, for the child’s identified 
parent, and when identified, for the identified parent’s spouse.   
Countable income under Medicaid includes income from the child’s legally responsible 
relatives living in the household, as well as any income from other members of the household 
that is given to the family.  The Medicaid income eligibility calculation disregards income from 
child support payments, work-related expenses, and child-care costs.  As of 2001, the maximum 
monthly deductions were $90 per worker for work costs and between $175 and $200 per child 
($200 for children under 3 years old and $175 per child 3 years and older) for child care costs.  
In calculating annual family income, we deducted $2100 (or $175 per month) for each child 
under 12 years of age for annual childcare expenses and $1080 (or $90/month) for work-related 
expenditures.  Finally, we divide the constructed family income variable by the family-size 
specific federal poverty line for either 1997 or 2001.     
To be sure, SCHIP income calculations differ from those specified by Medicaid 
eligibility rules in many states.  States that choose to implement SCHIP through a Medicaid 
expansion must conform to existing federal rules and provide the full range of mandatory 
Medicaid benefits, and are required to use the federal definitions of family and countable 
income.  Thus for these states, our definition of family income is likely to work quite well.  
States that design their own programs, however, have discretion in defining income, allowable 
disregards, and family size.
17  For these states, we would prefer to use these state-level family 
income definitions. However, states with stand-alone programs often do not clearly outline their 
income eligibility criteria.  According to Rosenbaum and Markus (2002), “the majority of state 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 Several studies (Shore-Sheppard 1996, Swartz 1986, Berger et al. 1998) have found that respondents often appear 
to be answering the question at a point-in-time rather during the previous year (as the question is posed).  However, 
for the purposes of this study, we treat the insurance variables as pertaining to the prior year. 
  15plans lacked clarity on the income standards and methodologies they would apply to determine 
eligibility under separately-administered SCHIP programs”.  Thus, for consistency and 
simplicity, we apply the Medicaid income definitions to all states. 
For 1997, we identify children that are eligible for Medicaid as those children who, given 
their age and family income relative to the poverty line, meet the eligibility criteria listed in 
Appendix Table A.  We identify children in 1997 who are hypothetically eligible for SCHIP 
benefits by identifying children who meet the SCHIP income criteria listed in Appendix Table A 
but did not meet the Medicaid criteria.  Note, since SCHIP did not exist in 1997 and the income 
criteria listed refer to the state programs in 2001, this second group of children essentially 
identifies the SCHIP target group prior to the program’s implementation. 
For 2001, we apply the 1997 Medicaid criteria to identify Medicaid eligible children and 
the 2001 SCHIP income criteria in conjunction with Medicaid income and age limits to identify 
the SCHIP eligible population.  Note this schema attributes all expansions in coverage between 
1997 and 2001 to the introduction of SCHIP.
18   
We measure whether a child is covered by insurance and the type of insurance using the 
retrospective coverage items from the CPS.  Since the insurance questions from the March CPS 
refer to the past calendar year, a respondent may report coverage from several sources.  We 
define children that receive either Medicaid or SCHIP benefits as being covered by public health 
insurance.  We define private coverage as having private insurance either provided by an 
employer or purchased individually.  Total coverage consists of public coverage, private 
                                                                                                                                                             
17 State SCHIP plans do not consistently report the use of income disregards, nor whether the stated income 
standards include or exclude these disregards (Green Book 2000). 
18 Note, several states provide SCHIP benefits through an expansion of their existing Medicaid programs, and thus 
Medicaid eligibility criteria are currently more generous in many states relative to the eligibility criteria for 1997.   
  16coverage plus a few other categories such as being covered by Medicare, CHAMPUS (military 
health insurance), or other government health insurance. 
  Table 1 presents sample averages by year for overall coverage, public and private 
coverage, and the proportion eligible for public coverage by program.  Between 1997 and 2001, 
the proportion of children with health insurance benefits increased by 3.3 percentage points, with 
an increase in public coverage of 2.3 percentage points and an increase in private coverage of 1.5 
percentage points.  The table also shows that while 34 percent of children were eligible for 
public health insurance in 1997
19 under Medicaid, slightly over half of children are eligible for 
either Medicaid or SCHIP benefits in 2001.  These eligibility figures correspond quite closely 
with the estimates of Dubay et. al. (2002), who use detailed information on state eligibility 
criteria and income definitions to gauge the eligible population.  This consistency suggests that 
our application of the Medicaid income definitions in defining the SCHIP eligible population is a 
reasonable strategy. 
  To depict the relative characteristics of the SCHIP eligible population of children, Table 
2 presents average personal, family, and parent characteristics for children by their eligibility 
status for public health insurance.  The table presents figures for the Medicaid-eligible and 
SCHIP-eligible populations, as well as for those children who by our imputations are ineligible 
for public health insurance.  Within each group, the table provides separate calculations by 
whether the children take up benefits.  All figures are for the year 2001.  Relative to the 
Medicaid-eligible population, children eligible for SCHIP are slightly more likely to have health 
insurance coverage (84 vs. 82 percent), while both eligible populations are considerably less 
likely to be covered than ineligible children (94 percent covered).  SCHIP children have higher 
rates of private insurance than Medicaid eligible children (66 vs. 40 percent) and are 
  17considerably less likely to take up public insurance benefits (22 vs. 46 percent).  A small fraction 
of children who we impute as ineligible for public insurance actually receive benefits (roughly 6 
percent).   
With respect to other characteristics listed in Table 2, SCHIP children are somewhat 
older than the Medicaid-eligible children (10.2 years old versus 7.2 years old), have higher 
incomes, are less likely to be minority, and reside in smaller families.  In addition, the parents of 
SCHIP children are somewhat older and considerably more likely to be married.   
Within populations defined by eligibility status, those who take up benefits have lower 
incomes, are somewhat younger, and are considerably less likely to reside in a family where the 
parents are married.  Take up also differs by type of public program.  While 46 percent of 
Medicaid eligible children are covered by public health insurance, only 22 percent of SCHIP-
eligible children are covered by public insurance in 2001.  This difference could be due to the 
fact that SCHIP is a relatively new program and that new programs take time to get off the 
ground.  In addition, SCHIP-eligible children by definition come from wealthier families who 
are more likely to have access to private health insurance.   
Estimating Take Up and Crowd Out and Assessing the Policy Effects 
  We estimate the effects of state level policy features on the take up of SCHIP benefits 
and the degree of crowd out by slightly augmenting a standard approach to estimating take up 
rates.  A typical methodological approach to estimating program take up following a program 
expansion involves calculating the pre-post change in the proportion of the eligible population 
receiving benefits.  For example, one could assess the overall take up rate for the SCHIP 
expansion by estimating the pooled equation 
                                                                                                                                                             
19 This is similar to the estimates in Shore-Sheppard (2000, 1997).  
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where i=(1,..,N) indexes observations in the data set, Publici is a dummy variable equal to one if 
child i has publicly-provided health insurance, Y2001i is a dummy variable indicating an 
observation for the year 2001 (from the 2002 CPS), Xi is a vector of control variables, α0, α1, and 
γ are parameters to be estimated, and εi is a normally-distributed error term.  One would estimate 
the regression using pooled data from the 1998 and 2002 CPS restricting the sample to those 
children that meet the 2001 eligibility criteria for SCHIP.  Given the introduction of SCHIP 
between 1997 and 2001, variation in the year dummy variable captures variation in program 
eligibility among otherwise similar children.  Thus, the estimate of the coefficient α1 provides the 
difference in public coverage rates between SCHIP eligible children in 1997 and 2001 after 
adjusting for observable differences, providing a fairly straightforward estimate of the program 
take up rate. 
  Measuring crowd out requires estimating the additional regression equation 
i i i i X Y ivate ε δ β β + + + = ' 2001 Pr 1 0     (2) 
where Privatei is a dummy variable equal to one if child i has private health insurance and all 
other variables are as defined above.  The coefficient β1 gauges the difference in average private 
coverage rates between 1997 and 2001 after adjusting for observable characteristics.  Given the 
introduction of SCHIP during this period, the coefficient can be interpreted as the decline in 
private health insurance among the SCHIP eligible population induced by the SCHIP expansion 
of public health insurance. 
  The rate of crowd out equals the absolute value of the decline in private health insurance 
coverage divided by the program take up rate.  Thus, calculating crowd out from regression 
  19equations (1) and (2) requires simply dividing the absolute value of β1 from equation (2) by α1 
from equation (1).
20
  To incorporate variation in policy implementation, we augment equations (1) and (2) to 
permit take-up and crowd-out rates that vary with state policy efforts.  Specifically, let Policyi be 
a Jx1 vector of dummy variables, where each dummy variable indicates whether the state of 
residence of child i uses the outreach or anti-crowd out policy in implementing their SCHIP 
program, and  be an element in this vector.  We estimate the differential effect of each 
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' 2001 * * ' 2001
1
1 0  (3) 
where the principal differences between equations (3) and (1) are the additions of the vector of 
policy dummy variables and a complete set of interaction terms between the policy dummy 
variables and the Y2001 dummy variable.  The base policy effects, captured by the vector of 
coefficients κ, net out inter-state variation in public coverage that may be correlated with the 
adoption of a specific outreach or anti-crowd out policy.  The coefficients on the interaction 
terms, θ1,..,θJ, measure the extent to which public coverage increased by a differential amount in 
states that adopt policy j, holding constant all other policy efforts of the state.  The coefficients 
on these interactions terms are our principal estimates of the effect of specific policies on take 
up.   
  To assess policy effects on crowd out, we similarly augment equation (2) to allow for 
state policy variation, or 
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of the SCHIP expansions on the change in the proportion of children with health insurance in state-income group 
cells. The change in the proportion eligible for SCHIP is instrumented with the hypothetical proportion of children 
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Here the base policy effects given by the vector of coefficients, λ, capture inter-state differences 
in private coverage rates correlated with the adoption of specific policies.  The coefficients on 
the interaction terms, ψ1,...,ψJ, gauge the extent to which the change in private coverage in states 
with policy effort j differ from the comparable change in states not making this effort, holding 
constant all other policies implemented by the state.   
  Figures 8 and 9 depict the number of states with each of the state policy design features 
that we analyze here.  Appendix Table B provides a complete state-by-state accounting for each 
of these features culled from Cohen-Ross and Cox (2002).  Most of the design features presented 
in Figure 8 are directed towards simplifying the application and renewal processes and lowering 
the costs of applying for benefits.  For example, eliminating face-to-face interviews for the initial 
and renewal applications, permitting the self-declaration of residency status, income, and of 
child’s age, allowing for twelve-month continuous eligibility where income is not verified 
monthly, allowing for family applications and family renewal applications, and (in the event of a 
separate state SCHIP program) having a joint SCHIP/Medicaid application all facilitate applying 
for benefits at minimal personal costs.  Thus, one would expect each of these features to increase 
program take-up rates. 
Similarly, presumptive eligibility, whereby children meeting certain criteria are presumed 
eligible by health service providers and covered under the program while a formal application is 
processed, should also increase the number of households receiving benefits.  The elimination of 
asset tests clearly expands eligibility and should increase coverage, while expanding public 
                                                                                                                                                             
who would have been eligible in 1997 for SCHIP under the 2001 eligibility criteria.  Our IV results are qualitatively 
similar to those without IVs presented in this paper and are available from the authors upon request. 
  21health benefits to parents, either through an expansion of Medicaid or the extension of the 
SCHIP program, should augment the number of families within the system. 
  Two of the design features in Figure 8 are commonly thought to impede SCHIP take-up.  
Specifically, in states with age-specific Medicaid criteria (that is to say, variation in Medicaid 
eligibility for children under 18), families may find that while their younger children are eligible 
for Medicaid benefits, their older children are eligible only for SCHIP.  In such situations, 
application costs may be higher, and thus SCHIP take-up lower.  In addition, states with separate 
SCHIP programs that are not integrated into their Medicaid programs may have a more difficult 
time signing up potential beneficiaries, as the SCHIP program may be less able to benefit from 
Medicaid outreach and screening efforts.  Thus, a priori, one might argue that these two features 
exert negative effects on take-up.  
  Figure 9 shows the distribution of states by the length of the mandatory waiting period 
required before an uninsured child becomes eligible for SCHIP benefits.  The most common 
possibilities are no waiting period, a three-month waiting period, and a six-month waiting period.  
In the models estimated below, we group states into three categories: those with no waiting 
periods, those with a positive waiting period that is three months or less, and states with a 
weighting period that is at least four months.  Of course, we anticipate that the waiting period 
variables will exert negative effects on take-up, all else held equal. 
   
V. Estimation Results 
  In this section we present the main results of the paper.  We begin by estimating the 
overall take up rate for the expansion between 1997 and 2001 and compare these estimates to the 
findings from existing research.  We then present our assessment of the effect of policy variation 
  22on inter-state differences in take up rates and crowd out.   
Base Estimates 
Table 3 presents tabulations of the proportion of children with any health insurance 
coverage (Panel A), with publicly provided health insurance coverage (Panel B), and with 
private health insurance coverage (Panel C) by year and by eligibility status for public programs.  
Within each panel, the tables provides the proportion covered by year, the change in the 
proportion covered between 1997 and 2001, and the regression adjusted change in coverage from 
two alternative specifications.  The first specification controls for a third-order polynomial in 
age, a male dummy, and a full set of dummy variables indicating income relative to the poverty 
line in 25 percent increments (with the omitted category being over 400 percent of the poverty 
line).  The second specification adds a full set of state dummy variables to the first specification.  
For the SCHIP eligible population in Panel B, the unadjusted change and the adjusted changes 
correspond to the coefficient on the year dummy in equation (1).  For the SCHIP eligible 
population in Panel C, the changes in coverage correspond to the coefficient on year from 
various specifications of equation (2). 
Beginning with Panel A, both Medicaid eligible and SCHIP eligible children experience 
an increase in overall coverage, with a 5 percentage point increase in coverage rates for the 
Medicaid eligible and a 6.2 percentage point increase for the SCHIP eligible.  Ineligible children 
experience a smaller yet statistically significant increase in coverage of 1.2 percentage points.  In 
all specifications, the relatively larger increases in coverage among SCHIP eligible children are 
statistically significant at either the 5 percent or one percent level of confidence (both relative to 
ineligible and Medicaid eligible children). 
  23 Panel B reveals much larger relative changes in the proportion of children covered by 
public health insurance.  Among SCHIP eligible children, the proportion receiving public health 
insurance increases by 10.5 percentage points.  Moreover, adjusting for observable 
characteristics does not appreciably impact this increase.  Among the Medicaid eligible, public 
coverage declines by a statistically significant 2.1 percentage points, while among those who we 
impute as ineligible, public coverage declines by 1.2 percentage points.   
The tabulations reveal that roughly 11 percent of the children we identify as SCHIP 
eligible yet Medicaid ineligible receive public health insurance benefits in 1997, even though the 
SCHIP programs were not up and running.  This problem in imputing eligibility is observed 
throughout the literature on take up and crowd out.  For example, Cutler and Gruber (1996) find 
in tabulations from the 1998 CPS that 21 percent of those made eligible for Medicaid between 
1987 and 1992 reported public health insurance benefits in 1987, while 8 percent of those not 
eligible by 1992 did so.  Similarly, LoSasso and Buchmueller (2002) find that 20 percent of 
children receiving public health insurance benefits are imputed to be ineligible for both Medicaid 
and SCHIP.  We believe that this imputation problem is likely to impart a downward bias to our 
take up rate estimates, although the direction is theoretically ambiguous.
21
The patterns in Panel C indicate substantial differences in the change in private insurance 
coverage across our three groups of children.  Among Medicaid eligible children, the proportion 
                                                 
21 Our reasoning concerning the direction of bias is as follows.  The take up rate is essentially the proportion of 
eligible children that receive benefits.  The fact that a proportion of the SCHIP eligible receive public benefits in a 
year when SCHIP did not exist suggests that our imputation procedure is incorporating too many very low-income 
children among the eligible population, thus increasing the denominator of the take up ratio.  However, proper 
calculation of countable income is likely to increase the number of relatively higher income families with children 
eligible for SCHIP benefits.  In other words, the imputation used here leaves out some upper income households, 
thus reducing the denominator.  Thus, the net effect of the imperfect imputation is ambiguous.  However, the 
empirical density of children by family income is more concentrated around the lower eligibility boundary than the 
higher eligibility boundary.  Based on this pattern, we believe that the number of low income children wrongly 
counted as SCHIP eligible is likely to exceed the number of higher income children that are wrongly counted as 
SCHIP ineligible. 
  24with private health insurance increased by 6.6 percentage points, a pattern most likely driven by 
the strong labor market and the impact of welfare reform on Medicaid take up rates.  For SCHIP-
eligible children, the proportion with private health insurance declined by 3.2 percentage points, 
although adjusting for observable characteristics and state-level trends reduces this decline to 
roughly 2 percentage points.  Among the ineligible, private insurance coverage declines by 
approximately 1 percentage point. 
The results for the SCHIP eligible population presented in Table 3 indicate overall 
program take up rates ranging from 10.1 to 10.5 percent.  Combined with the declines in private 
coverage observed in Panel C, these figures suggest that between 21 percent (based on adjusted 
changes 2) and 30 percent (based on the unadjusted changes) of the increase in public coverage 
is offset by a decline in private coverage.  LoSasso and Buchmueller (2002) present the most 
thorough study of take up and crowd out in the SCHIP program.   Using a somewhat different 
eligibility imputation procedure, the authors find take up rates ranging from 3.5 to 10.5 
percentage points and crowd out ranging from 18 to 50 percent.  Thus, our base estimates are 
consistent with existing research. 
The Effects of State Level Policy Efforts   
Table 4 presents regression results from estimation of equations (3) and (4).  Both models 
are estimated restricting the sample to SCHIP-eligible children for 1997 and 2001.  Recall, 
equation (3) models the likelihood of public coverage as a function of a 2001 year dummy, a set 
of dummy variables indicating the policy design features used by the person’s state of residence, 
a complete set of interaction terms between the year and policy design dummies, and a set of 
additional covariates.  The coefficients on the interaction terms provide our estimates of the 
effect of each policy variable on the state-specific take-up rate.  Equation (4) uses the same 
  25specification, but the dependent variable is changed to an indicator of whether the child is 
covered by private health insurance coverage.   
For both models, the table presents the base effect estimate for each policy variable in the 
first column and the coefficient on the interaction term with the year dummy in the second 
column.  The additional covariates included in each model that are not presented in the table 
include a third-order polynomial in age, a male dummy, dummies for income relative to the 
poverty line in 25 percent increments (over 400 percent being the omitted category), dummies 
for the race of the child and parent, dummies for the parent’s marital status, and whether the 
parent and child are immigrants.  The specification also includes dummies indicating states in the 
Northeast, Midwest, and South and interaction terms between these regional dummies and the 
2001 year dummy. 
For the public coverage model, the coefficients on the interaction terms between the 
policy variables and the year dummy indicate the degree to which employing the policy in 
question had a differential effect on take up rates after controlling for all other state efforts.  The 
results indicate that several policy design features are particularly effective.  For example, 
eliminating the asset test is predicted to increase take-up rates by 17 percentage points, 
continuous coverage increases take-up by 5.7 percentage points, while allowing for joint 
applications during the renewal process increases take-up by 7.6 percent.  As predicted, states 
with separate SCHIP programs that are not incorporated into their Medicaid systems have take-
up rates that are 9.7 percentage point lower on average.  In addition, in states that extend SCHIP 
benefits to parents, take-up rates among SCHIP eligible children are roughly 11 percent higher. 
We also find evidence of a consistent and substantial negative effect of waiting periods 
on state-take up rates.  Relative to states with no waiting periods, states that require a mandatory 
  26period of time after losing private health insurance to qualify for SCHIP benefits have take-up 
rates that are roughly 6 percentage points lower on average.  This negative effect does not vary 
with the length of the waiting period. 
There is one statistically significant result that does not confirm our a priori expectations.  
The results indicate that states that permit applicants to self-report their residency status have 
lower take-up rates than states that do not (a differential of 6 percentage points).   
The second model in Table 4 presents comparable results where the dependent variable is 
a dummy indicating whether the child is covered by private health insurance.  Here, the 
interaction terms between the policy variables and the year dummy indicate the extent to which 
the policy differentially displaces private coverage taking into account all of the other policy 
efforts of the state.  To the extent that the policy effort crowds out private coverage, the marginal 
effect read off the interaction term should be of the opposite sign of the comparable marginal 
effect from the public coverage model. 
The results indicate that only one of the policy design features that have a statistically 
significant positive effect on public coverage has a significant negative effect on private 
coverage.  Specifically, allowing continuous coverage reduces private coverage by roughly 5.4 
percent (nearly completely offsetting the increase in public coverage).  For the remaining design 
variables that impact public coverage in the predicted manner, there are no offsetting changes in 
private coverage. 
Does state variation in policy choices explain variation in take-up and crowd out? 
In Figure 6, we documented the fact that there is considerably heterogeneity across states 
in the degree to which eligible children took up SCHIP benefits as well as in the changes in 
private coverage rates during the time period corresponding to the implementation of SCHIP.  A 
  27natural set of questions to ask of the results presented in Table 4 concerns the degree to which 
inter-state differences in policy design explain this variation.  For example, knowing whether 
inter-state variation in the manner in which SCHIP was implemented explains the great degree of 
variation in take-up rates would provide valuable information to states.  In addition, such an 
assessment bounds the potential efficacy of policy design features in boosting take-up.   
With regards to crowd out, one might be interested in assessing the extent to which 
policy-induced variation in take-up effectively targets children that are unlikely to be covered by 
public health benefits.  Most of the design features analyzed here alter the relative attractiveness 
of public health coverage and generally ease the application process.  Certain features may be 
more likely to enroll those with a high likelihood of private coverage, such as states that waive 
mandatory waiting periods in determining eligibility.  Others features may be more likely to 
enroll those with a low likelihood of private coverage, such as extending benefits to parents or 
allowing for presumptive eligibility.   To the extent that policy efforts designed to increase take-
up effectively targets those with a low likelihood of private insurance, crowd-out that is induced 
by policy design should be relatively low.  On the other hand, if policy design choices are simply 
enrolling those who would otherwise have private coverage (but at a higher personal cost), than 
policy-induced variation in take-up should be associated with a relatively large degree of 
crowding out.  
Here we explore these questions.  We first assess the degree to which state differences in 
take-up rates can be explained by state difference in policy design by estimating take-up rates 
associated with the state policy choices.  We then assess the degree to which the crowd out 
associated with policy-induced variation in take-up rates differs from the overall degree of crowd 
out. 
  28We begin by using our model results from Table 4 to predict the change in public 
coverage rates that would have occurred for a given state based on the state’s policy design 
choices.  The expected value of public coverage for 1997 for a person with average values for the 
background covariates residing in state j is given by the equation 
X Policy Policy X Y Public E j j ' ' ) , , 0 2001 | ( 0 γ κ α + + = = ,    (5) 
where Policyj is the vector of values for the policy dummies for state j.  The comparable 
expected value for 2001 is given by the equation 
. ' )' ( ) , , 1 2001 | ( 1 0 X Policy Policy X Y Public E j j γ θ κ α α + + + + = =    (6) 
Subtracting equation (5) from equation (6) gives the predicted take up rate attributable to the 
state’s policy design choices as captured by the vector Policyj.  Thus, the policy-induced portion 
of take up is given by the equation 
j j j Policy Policy X Y Public E Policy X Y Public E ' ) , , 0 2001 | ( ) , , 1 2001 | ( 1 θ α + = = − =  (7) 
which is simply the sum of the coefficients on the year dummy variable and the relevant policy 
interaction terms.   
To assess the degree to which inter-state policy design variation explains inter-state 
differences in take-up, we estimate a simple bivariate regression of the actual state-level take-up 
rates (measured by the change in public coverage among SCHIP eligible children, 1997 to 2001) 
against the predicted state-level take-up rates from equation (7).  Figure 10 graphically displays 
this regression where each data point is weighted by the number of observations used to calculate 
the public coverage rate in 1997.
22  There is a strong positive correlation between the predicted 
policy-induced take up and the actual degree of take up across states.  Inter state differences in 
                                                 
22 Weighting by the 2001 total and the average of the 1997 and 2001 total yields similar results to those presented in 
the picture.  In addition, an un-weighted regression yields a considerably higher R-squared. 
  29quantifiable implementation strategies accounts for roughly 25 percent of the variation in take up 
across states.  Thus, a fair degree of the heterogeneity across states in take-up can be explained 
by differences in the manner in which SCHIP has been implemented. 
Next we turn to an assessment of the relative magnitude of private coverage crowd-out 
caused by policy-induced take-up.  Figure 11 presents a scatter plot of the change in private 
health insurance at the state level against the predicted policy-induced change in program take 
up.  In conjunction with the results in Figure 6, the results in Figure 11 permit an assessment of 
whether policy induced take up encourages a greater or lesser degree of private coverage crowd 
out than the take up that would normally occur among children eligible for SCHIP benefits.  The 
figure reveals a negative yet statistically insignificant relationship between predicted take up 
rates and the change in private coverage.  The point estimate of the slope coefficient suggests 
that a one percentage point policy-induced increase in take up rates is predicted to decrease 
private sector coverage by approximately 0.21 percentage points.  In Figure 6, which presented 
similar results where the observed change in public coverage is substituted for the predicted take 
up, the comparable crowd out estimate is 0.25.  A formal test of the equivalence of these two 
parameters estimates fails to reject the hypothesis that they are equal.
23   
 
VI. Conclusion 
The findings of this paper are several.  Using data from the 1998 and 2002 CPS, we find 
evidence that the introduction of SCHIP has reduced the proportion of near poor children lacking 
health insurance, although the overall take up rate is quite low (approximately 10 percent). While 
                                                 
23 The regression model in Figure 11 is equivalent to the second stage regression in a 2SLS model where the first 
stage regresses take-up on the policy variables while the second stage regresses the change in private coverage on 
take-up.  Thus, a Wu-Hausman exogeneity test provides the appropriate formal test for the equivalence of the slope 
coefficients in Figures 6 and 11.  Performing this test fails to reject the hypothesis of equality. 
  30not all of the state policy efforts effective, several design mechanisms have significantly boosted 
take up rates.  Specifically, eliminating the asset test, allowing for continuous coverage, 
simplifying and consolidating public health insurance programs, and extending benefits to the 
parents of eligible children all have sizable positive effects on take up rates.  Moreover, our 
results suggest that approximately 25 percent of the inter-state variation in SCHIP take up rates 
between 1997 and 2001 is attributable to inter-state differences in outreach policy choices.  
Given that the vast majority of uninsured children are eligible for Medicaid or SCHIP, much of 
the problem of uninsured children in the U.S. could be addressed through existing programs and 
more effective outreach efforts.  
To be sure, states must balance enrollment growth against private coverage crowd out in 
order to minimize the average program costs per newly insured individual.  Given that SCHIP 
targets children at higher income levels who are more likely to have access to private health 
insurance, substitution of public for private insurance could be quite high.  We find overall 
crowd out rates ranging from one quarter to one third of the increase in public coverage.  
Regarding specific anti-crowd out strategies, our results suggest that requiring a waiting period 
lowers take-up yet does not increase the degree of private coverage.  Finally, we find very little 
evidence that policy-induced variation in take up crowds out private coverage, and no evidence 
that the degree of crowd out caused by policy choices is worse than that for the program overall.  
Thus, state outreach efforts do not exacerbate this problem. 
Nevertheless, some degree of crowd out is inevitable when extending public benefits to 
those who have access to private insurance.  However, the costs of crowd out may be partially 
offset by other collateral benefits to recipient households.  Those who drop coverage may 
actually be better off if they end up with lower out-of-pocket costs and a more stable source of 
  31health insurance for their children and possibly themselves (if SCHIP benefits are extended to 
parents).  In addition, working parents may no longer be “locked” into current jobs by the need 
to maintain health coverage for their children.  Job mobility may rise for those with SCHIP 
eligible children and the average quality of parental job matches may rise.  Both issues provide 
fertile areas of inquiry for future research. 
Moreover, some state efforts to limit crowd out raise concerns regarding equity in the 
implementation of SCHIP.  Precluding low-income families who have paid for private insurance 
in the past from coverage under the SCHIP program while extending benefits to those who did 
not raises obvious horizontal equity concerns. 
While our results suggest that states may be able to boost enrollment through policy 
design choices, ongoing state budget crises are likely to limit such efforts, and thus the efficacy 
of the program.  According to Hill, Stockdale, and Cournot (2004), most of the thirteen states in 
their study cut spending entirely on SCHIP outreach.  In addition, nearly one-third either reduced 
eligibility or capped enrollment.  While political support for SCHIP remains strong and cuts in 
SCHIP budgets have been small relative to those imposed on other state programs, our findings 
suggest that these program rollbacks are likely to hamper further efforts to increase coverage 
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  34Figure 1 
Proportion of Children 18 and Under Eligible for Public Health Insurance Benefits Under the Medicaid and SCHIP 








































































































































  35Figure 3 
Change in the Proportion of Children Eligible for Public Health Insurance by Income Relative 































































































Proportion of Children 18 and Under Covered by Public Health Insuranc by Income Relative to 































































  36Figure 5 
Proportion of Children 18 and Under with Private Health Insurance Benefits by Income 































































Figure 6  
 
Scatter Plot of the 1997 to 2001 State Level Change in Private Health Insurance Coverage Among SCHIP Eligible 
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Change Private Coverage=0.00-0.25*Change Public Coverage, R2=0.06
    t-statistics                         (0.06) (-1.67)
 
  37Figure 7 
Proportion of Children Under 18 With Health Insurance Coverage by Income Relative to the 




















































































Eliminate Renewal Face-to-Face Interview
Self-Declaration of Child's Age
Self-Declaration of Residency
Separate SCHIP Program





Expanded Medicaid for Parents
Self-Declaration of Income
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Scatter Plot of the 1997 to 2001 State Level Change in Public Health Insurance Coverage Among SCHIP Eligible 
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Change  Public Coverage = 0.007+0.71*Predicted  Take Up,  R2 = 0.25
      t-statistics                        (0.27)  (3.92)
 
  39Figure 11 
Scatter Plot of the 1997 to 2001 State Level Change in Private Health Insurance Coverage Among SCHIP Eligible 
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Change Private Coverage= 0.004-0.21 *Predicted Take Up, R2=0.02
     t-statistics                      (0.12)     (-0.97)
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Table 1 
Proportion of Children 18 and Under Covered by Health Insurance by Type and the 
Proportion Eligible for Public Health Insurance, 1997 and 2001 
 1997  2001  Change 
Coverage Rates 
  Covered   0.847 (0.002) 0.880 (0.001) 0.033 (0.002)
   Public 







Eligible Among All 
Children 
   Medicaid Eligible  0.339 (0.002) 0.323 (0.002) -0.016 (0.003)




   Medicaid Eligible 








Standard errors are parentheses.  Figures for 1997 are calculated from the 1998 March CPS.  
Figures for 2001 are calculated from the 2002 March CPS. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Children and Parent Characteristics by Eligibility Status for Medicaid and SCHIP During 2001 and 
by Whether the Child Received Medicaid or SCHIP Benefits 
  Medicaid Eligible  SCHIP Eligible  Not Eligible for Either SCHIP or 
Medicaid 
            Total  No Public
Coverage 
  Public 
Coverage 





























































































































Tabulations are based on data from the March 2002 CPS. 
  42Table 3 










Panel A: Has Health Insurance Coverage 
Medicaid  0.768 (0.004)  0.816 (0.003) 0.049 (0.004) 0.049 (0.004)  0.050 (0.004)
SCHIP  0.780 (0.005)  0.842 (0.003) 0.062 (0.005) 0.068 (0.005)  0.069 (0.005)
Ineligible  0.925 (0.002)  0.937 (0.001) 0.012 (0.002) 0.011 (0.002)  0.013 (0.002)
∆ SCHIP - 
Medicaid 
-  - 0.014 (0.007) 0.020 (0.007)  0.020 (0.007)
∆ SCHIP – 
Ineligible 
 
-  - 0.050 (0.005) 0.057 (0.005)  0.057 (0.005)
Panel B: Has Publicly-Provided Health Insurance Coverage 
Medicaid  0.483 (0.004)  0.462 (0.003) -0.021 (0.005) -0.009 (0.005)  -0.007 (0.005)
SCHIP  0.111 (0.003)  0.216 (0.004) 0.105 (0.005) 0.101 (0.005)  0.101 (0.005)
Ineligible  0.036 (0.001)  0.068 (0.001) 0.032 (0.002) 0.034 (0.002)  0.033 (0.002)
∆ SCHIP - 
Medicaid 
-  - 0.125 (0.008) 0.110 (0.008)  0.108 (0.008)
∆ SCHIP – 
Ineligible 
 
-  - 0.072 (0.004) 0.067 (0.004)  0.068 (0.004)
Panel C: Has Private Health Insurance Coverage 
Medicaid  0.329 (0.004)  0.396 (0.003) 0.066 (0.005) 0.054 (0.005)  0.053 (0.004)
SCHIP  0.690 (0.006)  0.657 (0.004) -0.032 (0.007) -0.023 (0.006)  -0.021 (0.006)
Ineligible  0.894 (0.002)  0.882 (0.002) -0.012 (0.003) -0.014 (0.003)  -0.011 (0.003)
∆ SCHIP - 
Medicaid 
-  - -0.098 (0.008) -0.077 (0.008)  -0.074 (0.008)
∆ SCHIP - 
Ineligible 
-  - -0.020 (0.006) -0.009 (0.005)  -0.009 (0.005)
Standard errors are in parentheses.  SCHIP eligible in 1997 refer to those children that would are 
hypothetically eligible in 1997 for SCHIP benefits under the 2001 eligibility criteria.  Unadjusted 
changes refer to the difference in means between the coverage rates reported in the second and 
third columns.  Adjusted change 1 refers to the corresponding regression-adjusted change, where 
the regression specification includes a third-order polynomial in age, a male dummy variable and 
a full set of dummy variables indicating household income relative to the poverty line in 25 
percent increments (omitted category includes children with households incomes that are 400 
percent or more of the poverty line).  Adjusted change 2 refers to the regression-adjusted change 
including all variables in the previous specification plus a full set of state dummy variables.  
Separate models are estimates for the Medicaid-eligible, SCHIP-eligible, and ineligible 
populations. 
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Table 4 
Regression Estimates of the Effect of State Outreach and Anti-Crowd Out Policy on the 
Take Up of Public Benefits and Likelihood of Being Covered by Private Health Insurance 
  Public Coverage  Private Coverage 
  Base Effect  Interaction with 
2001 dummy 





















































































































































































Note:  Regressions allow for state-specific variance components.  Control variables in the second specification include a third order 
polynomial in age, a male dummy, dummies for income relative to the poverty line in 25 percentage point increments (above 400 
percent omitted), race of child and parent, marital status of parents, immigrant status of the child and parent, dummies for Northeast, 
Midwest, and South, and a set of interaction terms between the region dummies and the year 2001 dummy.   
* Significant at the 10 percent level of confidence. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level of confidence. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level of confidence.
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 Appendix Table A 
Expanding Public Health Insurance for Children 
Medicaid and SCHIP Income Eligibility Guidelines by State 
 
State Plan  Type 
(as of March 
2001) 








Alabama Combo  All  Kids  33/133/100/15 200 
Alaska ME  Denali  KidCare  133/100/100/76  200 
Arizona SP  KidsCare  140/  133/100/32  200 
Arkansas ME  ARKidsFirst  200/200/200/200  200 
California Combo 
Access for Infants and 










Connecticut  Combo  Husky A & Husky B  185/185/185/185  300 





DC  ME  Healthy DC Kids   185/133/100/37  200 
Florida Combo  Florida  KidCare Program 185/133/100/28  200 
Georgia  SP  PeachCare for Kids  185/133/100/39  235 
Hawaii ME  QUEST 185/133/100/100  200 
Idaho ME    133/133/100/29  150 
Illinois Combo 
KidCare Assist, KdCare 










Iowa Combo  Healthy and Well Kids in 
Iowa (HAWK-I)   185/133/100/39  200 
Kansas SP  Health  Wave  150/133/100/100  200 
Kentucky Combo  KCHIP  185/150/150/150  200 
Louisiana ME  LaCHIP  133/133/100/100  150 
Maine Combo  Cub  Care 185/133/125/125  200 
Maryland ME  Maryland Children’s 
Health Program  185/185/185/34  200 
Massachuset
ts  Combo 
MassHealth Standard, 
MassHealth,  




Michigan Combo  Healthy  Kids & MIChild  185/150/150/150  200 
Minnesota ME  Minnesota  Care  275/275/275/275  280/275 
Mississippi Combo    185/133/100/34  200 
  45State Plan  Type 
(as of March 
2001) 






Missouri  ME  MC+ For Kids  185/133/100/100  300 
Montana SP  MT  CHIP 133/133/100/41  150 
Nebraska ME  Kids  Connection  150/133/100/34  185 
Nevada  SP  Nevada CheckUp   133/133/100/45  200 
New 
Hampshire  Combo  Healthy Kids Gold & 
Healthy Kids Silver  185/185/185/185 300 
New Jersey  Combo 
NJ FamilyCare Plan A & 
NJ FamilyCare Plans B, 
C, D 
185/133/100/41 350 
New Mexico  ME    185/185/185/185  235 
New York  Combo  Child Health Plus 
(CHPlus)  185/133/100/87 185 
North 
Carolina  SP  NC Health Choice for 
Children  133/133/100/100 200 
North 
Dakota  Combo   133/133/100/100  140 
Ohio ME  Healthy  Start  133/133/100/32  200 
Oklahoma ME  Sooner  Care 150/133/100/48  185 
Oregon SP  OR  CHIP  133/133/100/100  170 
Pennsylvania SP  PA  CHIP  185/133/100/100  235 
Rhode Island  ME  RIte Care  250/250/250/250  300 
South 
Carolina  ME  Partners for Healthy 
Children  185/133/100/18 150 
South 
Dakota  Combo  SD CHIP & CHIP NM  133/133/100/100  200 
Tennessee ME  TennCare 
1115 Waiver  400/400/400/400 400 
Texas Combo  TX  CHIP  185/133/100/17  200 
Utah SP  Utah  CHIP  133/133/100/100  200 
Vermont SP  Dr.  Dynassaur  225/225/225/225  300 
Virginia SP 
FAMIS (Family Access 
to Medical Insurance 
Security Plan)  
133/133/100/100 
  200 
Washington SP  Washington  CHIP  200/200/200/200  250 
West 
Virginia  Combo WV  CHIP  150/133/100/100  200 
Wisconsin ME  BadgerCare 
1115 Waiver  185/185/100/100 185 
Wyoming  SP  Wyoming Kid Care  133/133/100/55  133 
 
 
ME:  Medicaid Expansion; SP:  Stand-alone program Combo:  Combination (Medicaid expansion and 
stand-alone program)  Sources:  Shore-Sheppard (2003) and Green Book (2004)
















Self-Declaration of Child's Age
Family Application
Expanded Medicaid for Parents
Family Renewal Form
SCHIP Benefits Offered to Parents
No Waiting Period
One Month Waiting Period
Two Month Waiting Period
Three Month Waiting Period
Four Month Waiting Period
Six Month Waiting Period
Twelve month waiting period
Alabama 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
A l a s k a 0011001001100000000001
A r i z o n a 1111011011110000001000
A r k a n s a s 0011001011000000000010
C a l i f o r n i a 1111011000101000001000
C o l o r a d o 1111011001110000001000
Connecticut 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
D e l e w a r e 1111011101111100000010
D C 0011001000111101000000
F l o r i d a 1111001011100001000000
G e o r g i a 1111001111100000001000
H a w a i i 0011001001101101000000
Idaho 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
I l l i n o i s 1111011001100000001000
I n d i a n a 0111011101100000001000
I o w a 1111011001100000000010
K a n s a s 1111011101110101000000
K e n t u c k y 1111000101100100000010
Louisiana 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
M a i n e 1111011101111100001000
M a r y l a n d 0111001111100000000010
M a s s a c h u s e t t s 1111101101111101000000
M i c h i g a n 1111111011100000000010
M i n n e s o t a 1011001001111010000100
M i s s i s s i p i 1111111111100101000000
M i s s o u r i 0011001001111100000010
M o n t a n a 1111011001100000001000
N e b r a s k a 0011111001100001000000
N e v a d a 1111011001100000000010
N e w  H a m p s h i r e 1111001100000000000010
N e w  J e r s e y 1111101101011110000010
N e w  M e x i c o 0011111001010101000000
N e w  Y o r k 1111101100011001000000
N o r t h  C a r o l i n a 1111011101100100010000
N o r t h  D a k o t a 1111011001111000000010
O h i o 0011001001111101000000
Oklahoma 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oregon 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Pennsylvania 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rhode Island 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
S o u t h  C a r o l i n a 1011011001101001000000
S o u t h  D a k o t a 0111001101110100001000
Tennessee 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
T e x a s 1111011001100000001000
U t a h 1101011001100000001000
V e r m o n t 0111001111111101000000
V i r g i n i a 1111001001100000000010
W a s h i n g t o n 0111011111101100000100
W e s t  V i r g i n i a 1111011001100000000010
W i s c o n s i n 0011001111111110001000
W y o m i n g 1111011111110100100000
Total 31 35 49 49 7 28 49 21 15 45 46 23 19 24 4 18 1 2 13 2 14 1
    
Source:  Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (2002), Greenbook 20  